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What Confucius would make of it 
Charles Stafford 
• Governing educational desire: culture, politics and schooling in China By Andrew 
Kipnis  
• Drink water, but remember the source: moral discourse in a Chinese village By Ellen 
Oxfeld 
About a quarter of the way into Andrew Kipnis’s fascinating new book the accumulating 
evidence starts to sink in: he is not kidding when he says that people in China “desire” 
education to a remarkable extent. In Zouping, Shandong, where he conducted fieldwork, the 
new Number One Middle School cost 230 million yuan to build (about $35 million at current 
exchange rates). The campus – “which resembles that of a small university” – is networked, 
of course, and boasts an Olympic size pool, not to mention “all manner of specialized 
equipment” (p. 32). Parents want their children to attend a marvelous school of this kind in 
the hope that doing so will secure them admission to a good university – even though, as 
Kipnis points out, going to a technical college would actually give many of them better job 
prospects. This fact notwithstanding, paying for university (the tuition fees have 
“skyrocketed”) has been added to the list of standard parental obligations, even replacing 
house building “as the most important large-ticket expenditure for many rural families” (p. 
35). 
Then there is the question of what actually happens inside schools. The schedule for one 
junior middle school in a rural township, as reported by Kipnis, is very striking. The students 
there are boarders and follow a more or less nonstop routine from 6.15 a.m. until lights out 
at 9.40 p.m., including four discussion and study sessions after dinner. Little wonder that a 
fifteen-minute period is set aside at 2.45 p.m. for them to do eye exercises: an attempt to 
deal with problems arising from “the intensity of study” (p. 41). 
  
In brief, it all sounds a bit mad, and Kipnis does refer to the Chinese obsession with 
educational achievement as a kind of fever. 
One might assume that this fever (a problem, it must be added, that many countries would 
dearly love to have[1]) is fed by a scarcity of places in middle schools and universities. In fact, 
secondary and tertiary educational provision has expanded hugely in China in recent years. 
As Kipnis notes (pp.39-40), getting into an academic senior middle school is now relatively 
easy – something like 80 percent of students in Zouping do so. And then a high proportion 
of these students manage to perform well enough to gain admission, in due course, to 
either a regular university or another tertiary programme of some kind (about 40 and 45 
percent respectively). 
So what is the fuss about? Kipnis observes that “… the intensity of educational desire in 
Zouping [and, by extension, elsewhere in China] arises from the interactions and mutual 
influence of thousands of actors and governing actions” (p. 53-4). We are dealing here with 
a “total social phenomenon” for which no simple causal account can be given. For example, 
one – perhaps unexpected – factor in the case of Zouping is local government indebtedness. 
Briefly, the county has been successful at getting students into university and this has 
allowed local schools to attract fee-paying students from elsewhere. This fee income, in 
turn, has enabled Zouping to pay off some of the huge loans taken out to build the 
remarkable facility mentioned above, i.e. the Number One Middle School with its networked 
classrooms, etc. Of course, in order to keep fee-paying students coming it is vital (as local 
education officials well know) that university entrance figures for Zouping should remain 
very good in relative terms, with the result that, well, they are (p. 40). 
*** 
This illustration raises one of the questions at the heart of Kipnis’s book: what exactly is the 
role of various levels of government, and various officials, vis-à-vis educational desire in 
China today? In some respects, this phenomenon is surely a monster of the state’s creation. 
China’s so-called one child policy was meant to result in fewer children, but also ones of 
“higher quality” as parental investment in each child increased. The difficulty is that parents 
took this logic very seriously indeed, so much so that the role of the state in recent years has 
actually been to try to constrain the monster of parental investment in children’s education, 
so that it does not get completely out of hand (p. 65 ff). 
Kipnis provides interesting examples of this from Shandong. Broadly in line with national 
policy, well-meaning officials there have sought to promote “education for quality”: i.e. to 
promote a system that gives students a bit of breathing room, or at least does not literally 
crush them to death with work. They required schools to cut back on classroom hours, they 
banned the organization of study sessions during holidays, they explicitly encouraged 
students not to overspecialize too early in their schooling (as many had been doing for exam 
purposes), and so on. As Kipnis notes, however, initiatives of these kinds have had mixed 
success. In a number of cases, schools – under pressure from fidgety parents and students 
alike – have managed to break new guidelines. Where they could not, the market for private 
cramming schools and tutoring has expanded to fill perceived gaps in public provision (pp. 
77-81). In other words, the educational desire juggernaut is not easily stopped. Kipnis 
comments that “… it has been much easier to bolster [educational] desire than tame it, 
more profitable to bet on its expansion than to invest in its redirection” (p. 89). 
In seeking to provide a synthetic account of this situation, Kipnis focuses, for most of the 
second half of his book, on levels of analysis beyond the local. More specifically, he relates 
the phenomenon of intense educational desire, as observed by him in Zouping, to issues of 
national governance (Chapter 3), to a more general “imperial governing complex” that is 
found, he suggests, across East Asia (Chapter 4), and ultimately to “universal dilemmas of 
human desire and social hierarchy” (Chapter 5). The analysis in these chapters is ambitious 
and thought provoking, and I admire the agenda behind them, i.e. the attempt to explain 
the local with respect to the national and even the universal. However as I read these 
chapters I also found myself wishing, for reasons I’ll explain in a moment, that I knew a bit 
more about people in Zouping, and especially about everyday life there outside of schools. 
*** 
By contrast, Ellen Oxfeld’s new book is “unabashedly ethnographic” from start to finish, as 
she herself puts it. Her focus in Drink water, but remember the source is on morality, but not 
as this might be “ascertained with reference to a great text or unyielding set of rules” (p.xv-
xvi). She wants instead to know how people really live morally, and think and talk about 
moral questions, in the flow of everyday life. She provides us with an excellent account of 
this. 
Of course, many observers have claimed that China is suffering from a kind of moral vacuum 
in the post Mao era, when neither traditional nor Communist values appear to have much 
purchase, and nothing other than consumerist individualism has shown up to replace them. 
But if there is a moral vacuum in China, the people of Moonshadow Pond – the single 
surname village in Guangdong where Oxfeld conducted fieldwork – appear not to have 
heard about it. More specifically, although these people frequently disagree about the 
nature of particular moral obligations they nevertheless agree that such obligations exist. To 
be human, they say, is to incur moral debts of various kinds, starting from within the family. 
And someone who forgets these debts, and fails to repay them in appropriate ways, has 
shown himself to be without “conscience” (liangxin). In short, memory and morality are 
deeply intertwined. 
Oxfeld provides the illustration of a local leader who went out on a limb, back in the 60s and 
70s, to help another man. Providing this help was controversial at the time and doing so 
eventually contributed to the leader having to step down from his post. Many years later, at 
the time of Oxfeld’s fieldwork, this history remained directly relevant to relations between 
the two men’s families. Had the one who received help actually forgotten about it? 
Sometimes he was accused of having done so. When he behaved badly towards his former 
patron in the present, the patron’s wife commented to Oxfeld that it’s like the old proverb: 
a person saves somebody’s dog “… only to have its owner send it back to bite them!” (p. 55). 
*** 
With all this talk of obligation and memory, one might imagine the moral universe of 
Moonshadow Pond to be fundamentally backward looking and therefore conservative. The 
reality, Oxfeld suggests, is that the moral landscape of rural China has been greatly 
transformed in recent decades. The economy has changed, of course, but then so too have 
family life, religion, local politics and just about everything else. Perhaps partly as a result of 
this, for there to be debate and disagreement about moral issues is the norm rather than 
the exception. Indeed, as Oxfeld observes, even individuals may hold, within themselves, 
competing models or “schemas” about what should happen in particular circumstances – 
appealing in turn to traditional, Maoist, modern, etc., frameworks. 
Among other things, women in Moonshadow Pond confront “evolving and sometimes 
contradictory expectations” in relation to their roles as daughters and daughters-in-law (p. 
73). It is not just that expectations about these roles have changed, however, because many 
of the old principles seem to apply, at least some of the time. For instance, one woman 
spoke with Oxfeld about the background and qualities of her prospective daughter-in-law. 
The implication of her comments was that this girl was effectively “marrying up” by tying 
the knot with her son. As Oxfeld explains, older women may see this in a (morally) positive 
light: a socially inferior daughter-in-law will, in theory, be more subservient within her new 
family. Commenting on the daughter-in-law’s personality, this woman said: “Oh, she is 
somewhat shy … but if you curse her out, she doesn’t mind. Her personality is good!” (p. 
94). If this seems an old-fashioned view, one of Oxfeld’s points is precisely that radical 
changes to social life sometimes have the effect of selectively reinforcing traditional ideas. 
Or take the example of return migrants, i.e. overseas Chinese (often separated from their 
families as a consequence of the Civil War) who return to their ancestral homes on the 
mainland for brief or extended visits. Is this a good or a bad thing? In theory it is a wonderful 
thing, partly because such visits are seen as a manifestation of “traditional” morality, but 
also because return migrants often invest in their home communities. Oxfeld relates the 
story, for instance, of Old Guosheng – a retired Nationalist Army pilot, rather comfortably 
off financially, who left his home in Taiwan to set up residence in Moonshadow Pond, his 
ancestral village. This should have been great news for the community. But as Oxfeld points 
out, having “a potential benefactor in the midst” of the village also “sets gossip and stories 
in motion, as well as negative moral evaluations about those who are seen as trying to curry 
favor in order to get personal financial rewards” (p. 168). Moreover, evaluations of the man 
himself – simultaneously “one of us” and a foreigner – were ambivalent. Old Guosheng was 
rich, by local standards, but he also had such a bad temper that one woman who cooked for 
him eventually quit because of it (in spite of the fact that he had provided her with 
significant financial assistance). Indeed, it seems that the basic reason this bad-tempered 
man moved to Moonshadow Pond was his desire “to avoid his family in Taiwan” – his wife 
and sons were there, but he couldn’t get along with them – rather than any particular wish 
to reunite with abandoned kin on the mainland. As local people put it, this guy has money, 
sure, but he evidently doesn’t know how to zuo ren, “behave properly”. 
*** 
The question of proper behaviour in Chinese contexts brings me to a general observation 
about both of these books, when taken together. Neither Kipnis nor Oxfeld has a great deal 
to say about Confucianism, as such, and probably with very good reason. As Kipnis points 
out, to speak of Confucian ideals as the ultimate source of educational desire in China is to 
risk being accused of orientalism. After all, describing China as Confucian is like describing 
Europe as Christian: it explains everything and nothing. Oxfeld, for her part, puts the word 
Confucianism in scare quotes at least a couple of times, highlighting the fact that she 
doesn’t really believe there is some easy correspondence between properly Confucian 
theory/ideals/texts and what she observes on the ground in Moonshadow Pond. 
Still, it’s hard not to draw the conclusion that the picture of 21st century China drawn in 
these two books is unremittingly Confucian. Kipnis focuses on education, and more 
specifically on a situation in which the traditional Chinese emphasis on learning and 
educational achievement (both as an end in itself and as a means of being filial) has been 
taken to a stunning extreme. What could be more Confucian than that? Oxfeld focuses on 
morality, and points out, as I’ve said, that people in her fieldwork village often seem to be 
selecting between the rather wide range of moralities on offer. And yet it often seems to 
come back to the enduring demand, in the Chinese countryside, that people should never, 
ever forget their moral obligations, especially vis-à-vis their elders and their ancestors. Drink 
water, but remember the source. Surely this represents a kind of victory for Confucianism 
over the forces of (anti-Confucian) Maoism, market-oriented individualism, and whatever 
else has come. 
But is a Confucian picture of modern China an accurate one? My own view is that it is 
indeed accurate: both of these books are wonderfully empirical and therefore very 
convincing. Having said this, what they perhaps do not convey, at least not fully, is the 
darker, less regimented, certainly funnier, possibly crazier – and in some respects very un-
Confucian – China that also exists out there. I sometimes think of this, in a kind of mental 
shorthand, as being a “Daoist” China, meaning one that is roughly opposed to the po-faced 
seriousness of Confucianism while still being deeply moral (and serious) in its own 
distinctive way. (Of course I am not suggesting that when this is found in today’s China it is 
always literally linked to the practice of Daoism, as such.) 
This takes me back to the point I made above, that in Kipnis’s book in particular I would 
have been interested to know more about what happens outside of schools, where I suspect 
that some of this other China can be found, even in an education-mad province like 
Shandong. (Oxfeld, for her part, is more conventionally holistic in approach than Kipnis, and 
she gives us very well-rounded portraits of a number of key informants, including their 
moral frailties and their religious [in some cases Daoist, as it happens] practices as observed 
in everyday life. However her desire to work against the idea that China is suffering from a 
moral vacuum arguably leads to her drawing a somewhat strait-laced, i.e. Confucian, image 
of the place as a whole.) My own experience when doing research on schooling in Taiwan 
many years ago[2] was that parents there were very keen for their children to be taken over 
by the educational apparatus – if that is what it took for them to succeed in life. And yet the 
Confucian/nationalist orientation of local schools was, in some respects, diametrically 
opposed to the moral orientation (as well as the general life aesthetics) of these parents and 
their communities. Schooling had profound effects, of course, but I would say that neither 
the children I met nor their elders had capitulated entirely to its Confucian/nationalist 
ideologies. In my experience, they had a healthy skepticism not only towards schooling but 
in fact towards pompous “good behaviour” in general. In subsequent fieldwork in rural 
mainland China, including most recently in Heilongjiang, I have observed a very similar spirit 
and general life aesthetics among many of the people I’ve met, including young people who 
spend a great deal of time at school. 
Anyway, my point is that if traditional Confucian morality is shown, by these books, to have 
persisted into China’s modern era in some form, it is also true that other, perhaps equally 
traditional, ways of living continue to rumble on as well. 
Kipnis reports, by the way, that the very Confucian-sounding motto of Zouping’s Number 
One Middle School is spelt out in huge letters over the school’s central office building: “Be 
the First to Worry and the Last to be Happy”. What a thing to say to youngsters as they 
arrive at school every morning! In fact, as Kipnis notes, the motto is taken from the 
politician-scholar Fan Zhongyan, and its substantive meaning – something like “Place the 
Affairs of the Nation Before Your Own Happiness” – is rather less exotic sounding than the 
literal translation. Of course, the students meanwhile have their own version, half-jokingly 
reported to Kipnis: “Happiness will only come to those who first worry about their studies” 
(p. 38). Perhaps. 
1. [1] For an interesting comparative case, see Chris Fuller’s review of Craig 
Jeffrey’s book, Timepass, which focuses in part on the “educational 
disaster” of two colleges in India: http://aotcpress.com/articles/timepass-
boredom/. ↩ 
2. [2] Charles Stafford (1995), The roads of Chinese childhood, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
